Fake IT support in Microsoft Teams: the inbox floods and an external chat asks for control of the PC
On Oct 26, 2026, Arctic Wolf described more than 400 cases in which an inbox fills with newsletters and an 'IT support' contact in Teams external chat asks for Quick Assist. What a small business can do.
The inbox fills, within minutes, with hundreds of newsletter and subscription confirmations. Then a Microsoft Teams message arrives from someone posing as IT support, offering to “fix” the very problem they just created. If the employee agrees, the next step is to open Quick Assist, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, or another remote-access tool and hand over control of the PC.
That is the pattern Arctic Wolf Labs described on October 26, 2026, from more than 400 incidents. What gets abused is a legitimate feature that ships turned on: external access, which lets a person in another Microsoft 365 organization find, call, and chat with employees, as long as both sides leave the option open.
The case matters for a small or mid-sized business because the way in is the mailbox and the Teams app of anyone on the team.
What happens
Mail bombing creates urgency and buries legitimate messages, including security alerts. Arctic Wolf reports that, in a significant number of cases, the Teams contact came with that flood or right after it. Help Net Security, on October 27, 2026, describes the fake support message arriving minutes after the inbox had been filled with hundreds of newsletter and subscription confirmations.
The name on the conversation is the center of the trick. Arctic Wolf saw the same patterns over and over:
- “(Internal)” in the display name, so the message looks internal. Teams, at the same time, labels the sender as external.
- A first name, such as “IT Service Desk (Matthew)”, “IT Service Desk – Liam”, or “IT Support (Scott McGhee)”, so it looks like a coworker on the service desk.
- The target’s language. Help Net Security notes messages written in the local language. Arctic Wolf cites “Supporte TI”, a French and Spanish variant of “IT Support”.
- Emoji, such as a shield, a wrench, and a check mark, across roughly a hundred markers or more. Arctic Wolf treats that as a possible sign of content created with AI.
- The target company’s name or domain in the display name, in the most recent cases.
Between 30 and 40 percent of the cases analyzed used the free onmicrosoft.com domain, which needs no verification and can be ready in minutes. Arctic Wolf cites names such as helpdeskteam365 and itcoreportal and assesses that these domains are fake, not real Microsoft domains.
Over the past few months there has been a shift toward paid domains. Of the paid domains Arctic Wolf identified in this kind of scam, about 50 percent used .top, about 40 percent a standard .com, and just over 5 percent multi-level domains such as .com.pl, .com.vn, and .com.br. An address that looks local does not prove the sender is local. The same analysis records repeated use of .com.br and .com.vn in activity from July and August, and points to Sophos’s reporting on the Chaos ransomware campaign, in which attackers moved off throwaway onmicrosoft.com tenants and onto IT-themed .top domains.
When the person replies, the fake support contact often switches to a voice call inside Teams and asks for a remote-access program. The most common is Quick Assist: it is built into Windows, signed by Microsoft, needs no installation, and only asks the person to read back a six-digit code. AnyDesk, ScreenConnect (ConnectWise), TeamViewer, Atera, Zoho Assist, NetSupport, and LogMeIn also show up. When they want to stay after the call, they install a second commercial tool, which keeps working even if the first one is removed.
Attackers commonly contact several people at the same company inside a short window, about five minutes, most likely through automation. Once someone engages, the chain customers reported reaches malicious code execution in under 15 minutes. In several cases, credential-access alerts fired alongside the alert for the first chat: by the time anyone looked at the conversation, the computer was already compromised.
They avoid pasting a link into Teams, because it would be scanned, and download the file themselves during the remote session. In one case Arctic Wolf observed, the fake help desk had the employee run a command. The sequence ended in a program that listed the names and descriptions of user and computer accounts in Active Directory and sent that list to servers the attackers controlled. Some of the intrusions ended in data theft and ransomware.
This is not new, and it is not a Teams flaw
Arctic Wolf itself says external Teams chat as a way in is not new. Microsoft described the technique in mid-2024, in the campaign of the group it calls Storm-1811, known for deploying Black Basta ransomware. In its May 15, 2024 account, updated in June, Microsoft Threat Intelligence says that at the end of May 2024 Storm-1811 started using Teams to message and call people, with display names such as “Help Desk”, “Help Desk IT”, “Help Desk Support”, and “IT Support”. On the call, the person was talked into opening Quick Assist, entering a code, allowing screen sharing, and then approving control of the computer. The path continued into credential theft and, in several cases, Black Basta.
The technique later showed up in the Cactus, 3AM, and Chaos campaigns. Arctic Wolf also cites Zscaler’s report on the GoGRPC campaign, in which a Teams call and Quick Assist were used to install a backdoor. Justin Moore of Arctic Wolf told Dark Reading that he could not make a definitive attribution for the recent waves, and that Black Basta-associated activity remains one of the main drivers of this chat abuse.
Why it works at a small company
Employees are trained to distrust email. The message arrives inside the company’s own Teams, with a support name and the word “Internal”. The flooded inbox gives an urgent reason to accept help. Quick Assist does not look like a pirated program: it is a Microsoft tool already on Windows. On Windows 11, Microsoft says it is installed by default.
Dark Reading heard from Justin Moore that roughly 15 percent of cases moved past the initial stage into a successful compromise. At the volume of this campaign, that is enough to matter. Whoever gets in can steal credentials, copy data, and in some cases reach ransomware. A company does not need a large IT department to be a target. It needs one person with email and Teams, and the default external-access setting.
For the owner, the practical point is this. The attacker talks to several people in about five minutes. The defense that fits a limited budget is a rule everyone knows and a change in the Teams admin center.
What to agree with the team today
Write down, in one sentence, the company’s real support channel: the phone number, the ticket path, or the person who already handles IT. Say that support does not ask, out of the blue, to open Quick Assist, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer, or a similar tool. Especially not right after the inbox floods.
To check a support request:
- Read the External label and the sender’s real domain, not the friendly display name. “(Internal)” in the name does not make the person internal.
- Do not accept a first contact from an organization the company does not know.
- Confirm outside that conversation: call the number the company already uses, or ask the person who runs IT face to face. Someone who only controls the Teams chat cannot complete a check that happens on another channel.
- Microsoft’s guidance, in the 2024 account, is direct: only let someone connect with Quick Assist if you started the contact, with your own IT support or with Microsoft Support. Do not grant access to someone who says it is urgent.
If the inbox filled up and “support” appeared in Teams, stop. Do not read any code back. Tell the person who runs IT, on the channel you already agreed.
What to change in Teams
Microsoft documents these options in Manage external meetings and chat. The default is to allow all external domains.
In the Teams admin center, under Users > External access, next to Teams and Skype for Business users in external organizations:
- Allow only specific external domains. Add only the domains of partners the company actually talks to. Once that list is in place, every other domain is blocked. The other organization also has to allow your domain.
- The same page describes the block all external domains scenario: users can no longer find, call, chat, and set up meetings with people outside the organization. It fits a company that rarely talks to other organizations in Teams. Whoever administers Microsoft 365 applies that block.
Blocking a domain does not, by itself, stop someone from joining a meeting anonymously if anonymous meeting access is turned on. External chat and anonymous meeting join are separate settings.
On the same page you can turn off People in my organization can communicate with unmanaged Teams accounts. Those are accounts not managed by an organization, such as free Teams. If the company does not need them, leave it off. There is also an option to stop those accounts from starting a conversation.
Communication with tenants that have only a trial license is blocked by default, according to the same documentation. Confirm that nobody changed it to Allowed. The documented command to keep or restore the block is Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants "Blocked" (Teams PowerShell, at least version 6.4.0). Whoever administers Microsoft 365 does that check. It is not a step for someone who only uses chat day to day.
Remote access and who can install software
List what is installed: Quick Assist, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, Atera, Zoho Assist, NetSupport, LogMeIn, and similar tools. Remove what the company does not use. Microsoft recommends blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote-access tools when they are not part of the work. If support already uses another tool, Quick Assist can go.
The everyday account stays a standard Windows user. Installing software stays with whoever administers the computers. A tool that “Teams support asked to install right now” stays off the machine.
If someone already granted access
- End the remote session and disconnect the computer from the network: cable and Wi-Fi. Do not keep working on it.
- Call the person who runs the company’s IT, on the number that existed before the message. Do not use the chat that just arrived.
- From another device, change the account password and, in the Microsoft 365 admin center, revoke active sessions. If the person typed other passwords while the screen was shared, change those too.
- Do not wipe the computer on the spot. Isolating the machine keeps what is needed to understand what got in.
- If customer or employee data may have left, treat it as a possible personal-data incident, with whoever handles that at the company. This article does not replace that path.
In the 2024 account, Microsoft says to disconnect the session immediately if the activity looks malicious, and to tell IT and, where it applies, local authorities.
Frequently asked questions
Does Microsoft Teams have a flaw in this scam?
No, according to Arctic Wolf. The attacker uses external access, a legitimate feature that is on by default, to pose as IT support. There is no exploit of a known Teams vulnerability.
Is Quick Assist a virus?
No. It is a Microsoft tool for one person to help another at a distance. In the scam, the employee is talked into opening that tool and reading back a six-digit code. Microsoft says that on Windows 11 Quick Assist is installed by default, and recommends blocking or removing it when the company does not use it.
How many cases did Arctic Wolf analyze, and how many got past the first stage?
More than 400 incidents involving abuse of Teams external chat. Justin Moore told Dark Reading that roughly 15 percent moved past the initial stage into a compromise.
Does this describe a CGT client?
No. There is no CGT case, client, or result in this article.
Related reading
Two pieces already on this blog cover similar doors. One is the device-code scam in Microsoft 365, in which the person hands over access without typing a password. The other is the critical flaw in BeyondTrust Remote Support, on what to review when the remote-access tool is the support product itself.
How CGT can help
CGT supports small and mid-sized businesses with IT management, security, and Microsoft 365, within the scope agreed with each client: reviewing Teams external access, seeing which remote-access tools are installed, and agreeing with the team on the real support channel. Human support runs Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., São Paulo time.
Want to see who outside the company can reach your team in Teams? Meet CGT and talk to us.
Sources: Arctic Wolf Labs, Oct 26, 2026, Help Net Security, Oct 27, 2026, Dark Reading, Oct 27, 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, May 15, 2024, updated June 2024, and Microsoft Learn — Manage external meetings and chat.


