SafePay ransomware: why “we have a backup” is not enough for a small business
Joint advisory AA26-293A, published Oct. 20, 2026, describes SafePay ransomware, active since August 2024, with at least 600 victims. The group deletes backups before encrypting. What a small business can check this week.
Photo: Samsung Memory US · on Unsplash
“If we get hacked, it’s fine: we have a backup.” That sentence protects the company when a copy sits out of reach of whoever is already on the network. On October 20, 2026, the FBI, CISA, the U.S. Secret Service, Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz (the state police of Rhineland-Palatinate), and the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency and North West Regional Organised Crime Unit published joint advisory #StopRansomware AA26-293A on SafePay ransomware.
The group has been active since August 2024. The advisory records at least 600 separate victims, across businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, in North America, South America, Europe, and Australia. It also places SafePay among the most active ransomware groups of 2026. The tactics come from FBI, Secret Service, and Rhineland-Palatinate police investigations, with activity observed as recently as August 2026.
For an owner or manager of a small or mid-sized business in Brazil or Latin America, without a large IT team, the practical point is the order of the attack. The group copies data out and, before encrypting, removes the copies that sit on the same network.
How the group gets in
The advisory describes paths that are already known:
- exposed credentials;
- brute force, meaning trying passwords one after another until one works;
- VPN access with accounts obtained through phishing (a message that leads someone to hand over a username and password);
- flaws in edge devices exposed to the internet.
The advisory cites five flaws by number (CVE). The product name is in the NVD record, not in the text of AA26-293A. Anyone running one of these devices confirms the version on that CVE’s page. This article does not replace that check.
On edge devices, the advisory records these two:
- CVE-2020-3259. The NVD describes a flaw in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD). A remote attacker, without a login, can read memory contents on the device. The record limits the flaw to specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations. The NVD score is 7.5 (high).
- CVE-2023-20269. The NVD describes a flaw in the remote access VPN of the same products, Cisco ASA and FTD. Without authentication, an attacker can try username and password combinations. With authentication, an attacker can open a clientless SSL VPN session with an unauthorized user, and the NVD limits that second effect to Cisco ASA Software Release 9.16 or earlier. The NVD also records that the flaw does not skip login: a VPN session still requires valid credentials, including a second factor when multifactor authentication is on. The NVD score is 5.0 (medium).
On internet-exposed systems, the advisory records exploitation through automated scripts of three more flaws:
- CVE-2023-27532. The NVD describes a flaw in Veeam Backup & Replication. It allows encrypted credentials stored in the configuration database to be obtained, which may lead to access to backup infrastructure hosts. The NVD score is 7.5 (high).
- CVE-2024-40711. The NVD describes unauthenticated remote code execution from untrusted data. The affected product in the record, and the title CISA gives the flaw on that page, is Veeam Backup & Replication. The NVD score is 9.8 (critical).
- CVE-2024-40766. The NVD describes improper access control in SonicWall SonicOS management access, which can lead to unauthorized access to resources and, under specific conditions, cause the firewall to crash. It affects SonicWall firewalls of generations 5 and 6, and generation 7 running SonicOS 7.0.1-5035 and older. The NVD score is 9.8 (critical).
The question for whoever administers the firewall, the VPN, or the backup software is direct: is the fix already installed on this device, or only planned?
What happens inside the network
After entry, the group gains administrator rights on existing accounts or on new ones. It moves through the network with tools the company also uses: PsExec, WinRM (Windows remote management), and Remote Desktop (RDP). At other points it installs a remote access program — AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect — to stay on the network and to bring the ransomware onto the machines. The advisory describes AnyDesk and TeamViewer as a way to transfer the program. It describes ScreenConnect as a way to keep access.
The advisory records that the group commonly disables security software. On the RDP path, it cites Windows Defender. In some cases, it changes users’ passwords, and the real login stops working.
Data leaves before encryption. The advisory cites WinSCP and RClone for that copy. In some cases, OneDrive. In others, commands through the b2.exe tool sent files to Backblaze B2 storage. Packaging uses ordinary programs, such as 7-Zip and WinRAR. The advisory lists FileZilla as a tool for transferring data out of the network.
The files are then encrypted. The advisory says the file receives the .SafePay extension and that, without the key, there is no way to open it. The ransom note, typically on the desktop or in the root folder, asks for payment in cryptocurrency — typically a share of revenue — and points to a chat with a victim identifier. To apply pressure, a representative of the group calls. If there is no payment, the copied data goes to the SafePay leak site, whose address is in the note.
El Heraldo de Puebla calls that sequence double extortion: the file is unreadable and, at the same time, data about customers, suppliers, and employees can be published. Personal data that left the company can be an incident under Brazil’s LGPD. What to report, and to whom, depends on the case. This article is not legal advice, and it does not describe a CGT client.
Why a backup on the same network goes with it
Before encrypting, the advisory describes two steps against recovery. The group stops the Windows Volume Shadow Copy service, which keeps earlier versions of files. And it resets to factory settings the NAS that holds the backup. The NAS is the storage box connected to the office network. A factory reset wipes what was on it.
In some cases, the advisory records deletion of all backups attached to the network.
A copy on the NAS, or on a disk that stays connected to the same network as the computers, shares those computers’ fate. Whoever already has administrator rights uses that access to delete the copy. “We have a backup” describes a file. Recovery depends on a copy that those rights cannot reach.
The effect on operations is concrete. Everyday files become unreadable and work stops. If customer data left, the company is dealing with a leak and with the LGPD, on top of the outage. The group’s call asks for money in exchange for the key and for silence about that data. The agencies that signed the advisory do not encourage paying: payment does not guarantee the files will come back, it funds the group, and it signals that further attacks pay.
Latin America, from the source cited by El Heraldo
AA26-293A does not break victims out by country. The regional picture is in El Heraldo de Puebla’s October 27, 2026 analysis. The paper attributes to SCILabs, the threat intelligence unit of Scitum (Telmex), cited by UnoTV on September 7, 2026, these figures for the first half of 2026: Brazil was the Latin American country with the most ransomware attacks, with 25.17% of incidents in the region; Mexico was second, with 17.93%; across the region, attacks grew 25.54% compared with the previous half.
Those percentages come from that citation. They are ransomware attacks in the region, not a count of SafePay victims in Brazil. They locate the owner of a small business: the subject already shows up in Latin American operations, with Brazil first in that cut of the data.
What the agencies recommend
The advisory asks organizations to take these steps, among others:
- patch first what is exposed to the internet, especially firewalls, VPNs, and other edge devices, and keep operating systems, software, and firmware up to date;
- multifactor authentication (MFA) on every service where it is possible, particularly webmail, VPNs, and accounts that reach critical systems;
- long passwords, at least 15 characters and no more than 64, with no reuse of the same password; the advisory advises against mandatory changes more than once a year and asks for a lockout after multiple failed attempts;
- offline copies (disconnected from the network), encrypted and immutable — they cannot be altered or deleted — with restoration tested regularly, and more than one copy in a physically separate place;
- segment the network, so an intruder cannot walk the whole of it from a single point;
- review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and Active Directory for new, inactive, or unrecognized accounts;
- least privilege for administrators: the administrator account is not the everyday account;
- an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool, which watches each machine’s connections and helps show movement inside the network;
- a visible banner on email that arrives from outside the organization.
What to check this week
The list fits in a conversation with whoever looks after the network — a technician, a freelancer, or a provider — and in a decision by the owner. Each item is either in the advisory or is the practical question the behavior described there leaves on the table.
- Where is the copy today? If the only copy is on a NAS or on a disk connected to the same network as the computers, it is on the path the advisory describes.
- Arrange the copies with the 3-2-1 pattern. Three copies of what the business cannot lose, on two kinds of media, with one of them offline or immutable and somewhere else. AA26-293A does not use the name “3-2-1.” It asks for an offline, encrypted, immutable copy, tested, in a separate place. The pattern is a simple way to meet that request.
- Restore one file this month. Open the restored file and confirm it is the right file. A copy that has never been restored has not yet shown that it works.
- The NAS with no access from the internet. Its own password, different from the Windows administrator password and from the factory password, and MFA if the device offers it. NAS firmware up to date. Someone with administrator rights on the network can still reach a NAS connected to it. That is why the offline or immutable copy is still required.
- Firewall and VPN firmware. If the device is Cisco ASA, Cisco FTD, or SonicWall SonicOS, or if the backup product is Veeam Backup & Replication, ask whether the flaws cited above are already fixed on this installation.
- MFA on the VPN and on Microsoft 365. The advisory asks for MFA on webmail, the VPN, and critical accounts. In a small business that uses Microsoft 365, mail and a large share of critical accounts live there.
- A long password and a lockout. At least 15 characters, up to 64, with no reuse across services. The account locks after failed attempts. The advisory does not set how many.
- Who has remote access installed? AnyDesk, TeamViewer, and ScreenConnect are legitimate programs, and the group uses them too. List which machines have them and whether someone at the company asked for each install. What nobody recognizes comes off.
- New or unknown accounts, especially with administrator rights. An administrator account only for the person who needs it, and not for reading email every day.
- Outside email with a visible banner, so a message that imitates the company is easier to notice.
Segmenting the network, at the size of a small business, can start with one question: does the guest Wi-Fi reach the NAS? If it does, guests and the backup share the same space.
If the files show up encrypted
If encryption has not happened yet and a machine looks compromised, the advisory says to isolate it from the network. Plugging everything back in and carrying on the workday leaves the group inside.
The agencies do not encourage paying from the note. Payment does not guarantee the files will come back.
The offline disk stays disconnected from the affected network until that network has been dealt with. The good copy, plugged in at the wrong place, becomes the next one in line.
Keep the ransom note. Wiping the machine in a hurry also wipes the trace of who got in.
If customer or employee data may have left, treat it as a possible personal-data incident under the LGPD, with whoever handles that at the company. In the United States, the advisory asks organizations to report to the FBI or CISA. In the United Kingdom, it asks them to report to the national fraud channel or to local police. For a company in Brazil, this article does not replace the incident path agreed with counsel and with whoever runs IT.
Related reading
On October 19, 2026, this blog covered another backup door: the attack on ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick), in which the credential of the backup application inside Microsoft 365 was used to enter customers’ environments. That case is a third-party app with broad permission in the cloud. This one is the copy on the company’s own NAS or disk. Both can exist in the same business. Attack via ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick).
Frequently asked questions
What is SafePay ransomware?
It is a group active since August 2024. Advisory AA26-293A, dated October 20, 2026, records at least 600 victims in North America, South America, Europe, and Australia, and places it among the most active groups of 2026. The program encrypts files — the cited extension is .SafePay — and asks for payment in cryptocurrency.
Does having a backup protect a business from SafePay?
It protects when a copy is out of reach of whoever got in: offline or immutable, encrypted, tested, and kept somewhere else. The advisory describes stopping the Windows Volume Shadow Copy service, factory-resetting the backup NAS, and, in some cases, deleting every backup attached to the network.
Which flaws does the advisory cite, and in which products?
CVE-2020-3259 and CVE-2023-20269. In the NVD, both are in Cisco ASA and Cisco FTD. CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711, which the NVD associates with Veeam Backup & Replication. CVE-2024-40766, which the NVD associates with SonicWall SonicOS. The advisory carries the number. The product is in the NVD.
Should the business pay the ransom?
The agencies that signed the advisory do not encourage it. Payment does not guarantee the files will be recovered.
What can a small business check this week?
Where the copy is, whether one copy is offline or immutable, whether a restored file opens, whether the NAS answers on the internet, whether the firewall, VPN, and NAS are updated, whether the VPN and Microsoft 365 have MFA, and which machines have AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect.
Where do the Brazil and Mexico percentages come from?
From El Heraldo de Puebla on October 27, 2026, which attributes to SCILabs (Scitum), cited by UnoTV on September 7, 2026, this cut of the first half of the year: Brazil with 25.17% of ransomware incidents in Latin America, Mexico with 17.93%, and 25.54% growth in the region compared with the previous half. AA26-293A does not publish that country breakdown.
Does this article describe a CGT client?
It does not. There is no CGT case, client, or result in this article.
How CGT can help
CGT supports small and mid-sized businesses with IT management and security, within the scope agreed with each client: seeing where the copies are, whether the NAS answers on the internet, whether the VPN and Microsoft 365 have MFA, and walking through one restore test.
Want to know whether your company’s backup would survive an attack like this? Meet CGT and talk to us.
Sources: CISA, FBI, and partner agencies, advisory AA26-293A, Oct. 20, 2026, El Heraldo de Puebla, Oct. 27, 2026, NVD, CVE-2020-3259, NVD, CVE-2023-20269, NVD, CVE-2023-27532, NVD, CVE-2024-40711, and NVD, CVE-2024-40766.


